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I. INTRODUCTION
During its lifetime an integrated circuit (IC) may be sub-
jected to various types of attacks. Threats can be categorized
into Hardware Trojans, reverse engineering, counterfeiting,
and side-channel attacks [1]. Hardware security aims at under-
standing security breaches in ICs and developing mechanisms
for detecting attacks or preventing them by implementing
countermeasures for on-chip resilience. Hardware security
has been studied extensively for digital ICs recently, but for
analog, mixed-signal, and RF ICs the solution space is still
largely unexplored [2].
In this work, we focus on the problem of IC/IP piracy, which
includes reverse engineering and counterfeiting. In particular,
we develop a countermeasure for mixed-signal IC/IP piracy
that is based on design locking. Locking aims at modifying
the design, in order to introduce k key bits. There is only
one valid combination of key bits, i.e. the secret key, that can
result in correct functionality for any input. Otherwise, if an
invalid key is applied, then the functionality will be corrupted
for some or all inputs.
There are various techniques for locking digital ICs, known
as logic locking techniques. The earliest logic locking tech-
niques aimed at inserting key-gates into the design [3], i.e.
XOR and XNOR gates, controlled by the key bits. Researchers
are working in parallel trying to show the vulnerabilities of
existing logic locking techniques, proposing attacks that can
break them: (i) The brute-force attack sequentially applies
keys until the valid one is found; (ii) The SAT attack, the
most lethal attack based on a Boolean satisfiability solver,
can recover the secret key with very reasonable effort [4]; (ii)
Removal attacks aim at identifying and removing the added
protection logic; (iv) Approximate attacks aim at extracting a
key that establishes an incorrect yet approximate functionality.
The most recent state-of-the-art logic locking technique is
Stripped-Functionality Logic Locking (SFLL) [5] and provides
quantifiable resilience against these attacks.
Locking analog ICs is very challenging as the key bits need
to be introduced in a way that nominal performance is not
degraded. Techniques for locking of analog ICs are proposed
in [6]–[8], [10], [11] and are illustrated in Fig. 1. Specifically,
in [6], a locking technique for sense amplifiers is proposed
based on locking the body biasing of the transistor input
pair. The locking mechanism is based on an architecture that
comprises memristor crossbars. In [7], it is proposed to replace
transistors within the biasing circuit with parallel-connected
transistors whose gates are controlled by key-bits. The key-
bits enable transistors whose aggregate width equals that of
the original transistor. In [8], it is shown how to redesign the
Fig. 1. Locking techniques for analog ICs: (a) locking biases based on
memristor crossbars [6]; (b) obfuscating biasing transistors [7]; (c) locking of
current mirrors [8]; (d) locking mixed-signal circuits via logic locking of their
digital section [9]; (e) logic locking of the digital optimizer in the calibration
feedback loop [10]; (f) locking through neural network-based biasing [11].
current mirrors providing the biasing so as to insert key-bits.
In [10], it is proposed to lock the calibration feedback loop
via logic locking of the digital optimizer that is part of the
loop, such that it generates the wrong tuning settings unless
the valid key is applied. In [11], it is proposed to add on-chip
a neural network that is trained to map the secret analog key,
which is in the form of analog DC voltages presented as inputs
to the neural network, to the correct biases.
The secret key management scheme is common for all
locking techniques and includes storing the secret key on-chip
in a tamper-proof memory or generating it on-chip; in the latter
case, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) can be utilized to
even produce chip-unique keys.
In this work, we propose a technique called MixLock that
is based on locking a mixed-signal circuit via logic locking of
its digital section [9].
II. MIXLOCK
MixLock aims at securing mixed-signal IPs against piracy
through a logic locking mechanism applied to the circuit’s
digital section, as illustrated in Fig. 1(d). Only when the
valid key is provided the mixed-signal circuit performs its
intended function. Otherwise, for invalid keys the mixed-signal
performances are pushed outside of their specification, i.e.,
they are locked.
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Fig. 2. The Bandpass Σ∆ ADC used as case study.
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Fig. 3. Transient and frequency responses of the unlocked and a locked Σ∆
ADC.
MixLock presents several appealing properties. It is non-
intrusive since it does not alter the analog section, which is
key for its wide adoption by designers. Modifications in the
digital section do not affect mixed-signal performance either.
It incurs low area and power overheads since area and power
are dominated by the analog section which is left intact. It
is fully-automated since logic locking adds only one extra
synthesis step. Finally, this concept is applicable to a wide
range of mixed-signal circuits such as PLLs, RF transceivers,
data converters, etc.
Breaking Mixlock will require either recovering the secret
key via a logic locking attack or trying to unlock directly
mixed-signal performances by applying an iterative multi-
objective optimization algorithm. The latter is unlikely to suc-
ceed since mixed-signal performances do not show a smooth
monotonic relationship with the key bits. Regarding the former
attack, Mixlock is independent of the underlying logic locking
technique, but to achieve strong digital security Mixlock uses
the state-of-the-art SFLL logic locking mechanism [5].
III. RESULTS AND DEMONSTRATOR
To demonstrate MixLock, we used as case study a bandpass
(BP) Σ∆ ADC whose block-level schematic is shown in
Fig. 2. A Σ∆ ADC is decomposed into a Σ∆ modulator,
which is the analog section, and a decimation filter, which is
the digital section. In this case, Mixlock naturally locks the
decimation filter. SFLL was used to guarantee strong digital
security; in particular, a 64-bit resilience against the SAT
attack was obtained. By simulating thousands of randomly
chosen invalid keys we confirmed that Mixlock achieves strong
analog security; in particular, the main Signal-to-Noise Ra-
tio (SNR) performance was degraded dramatically below its
specification. Fig. 3 considers an arbitrarily selected incorrect
key and compares the transient and frequency responses of
the unlocked and a locked Σ∆ ADC. The locked Σ∆ ADC
presents a large amount of glitches in its transient response,
Fig. 4. Mixlock demonstration in an audio application.
which translate to a high noise floor in the frequency response,
resulting in corrupted SNR.
In addition, we demonstrated Mixlock in an audio applica-
tion [12]. The demonstrator, illustrated in Fig. 4, emulates a
microphone for capturing a sound source, signal processing
for digitizing the input audio, and a speaker for listening back
the sound source. MixLock is used to lock the Σ∆ ADC in the
signal processing chain. The effect of locking on audio quality
can be measured by the glitches introduced from the locking
operation that can be heard as noisy “cracks”. This demonstra-
tor helps us in essence to listen to the effect of locking. Audio
samples include speech recordings in German and English and
professional music recordings of various genres. The interested
reader can download and listen to the output audio samples
from this link: https://nuage.lip6.fr/s/CYowe89aXBe6rsP. The
downloadable archive includes the output audio samples in the
case of the unlocked design, where the valid key is applied,
and locked designs where a random invalid key is applied.
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